John Hamblin has been kind enough to forward me a very detailed account of the action mentioning Sergeant Major Elderkin, which is shown below and taken from the Divisional History. For him to have been included by name he must have been recognised as one of the more important men in the Battalion as being mentioned in this way is unusual.

"An attack was planned for the 23rd of April. In this attack  the 98th Brigade to the north was ordered to force it's way south down the Hindenburg Line, chiefly with bombs and make a junction with the 100th Brigade in the Sesee valley; the 100th Brigade delivering a frontal attack upon the Hindenburg Line. The attack was particularly difficult to carry out. The Hindenburg Line consisted of a highly fortified front and second line, with concrete machine gun emplacements, some of them with two storeys, about every fifty yards along it. Both lines were defended in front by strands of the thickest wire to a depth of about 20 yards and were connected by the most complete system of tunnels and dug outs that has ever been seen in the history of warfare".

An officer then serving with the 1st Queens wrote:-

"Sunday April 22^nd. The battalion moved off to a position of assembly in quarries half a mile north east of Croissilles, east of the Sensee River. They are to advance across 800 yards of open in the dark and attack the Hindenburg Line on a front of about 400 yards to the south of the Sensee River and to hold the line until the 98th Brigade, who are attacking down the Hindenburg Line from the north, have joined up; their right flank is to be protected by two tanks. A mad scheme in my opinion as if the 98th don't join up, they will be left in the middle of the German line with both flanks in the air and it will be impossible to get up reinforcements or ammunition until dark. In addition the advance to within 200 yards of the enemy in the dark is a most difficult and dangerous operation; the wire in front of the enemy is very strong, in three lines radiating from a centre, and only gaps have been cut by artillery. Two companies of the KRRC are following the battalion with bombs, ammunition etc."   

The battalion passed through Hamlincourt about 7.30pm on the 22nd and picked up extra ammunition and bombs near Judas Farm and reached the place of assembly about 11.30pm; here 20 entrenching tools per company were distributed and hot cocoa was served out, and at 3.30 am on the 23rd the Queens moved on from the quarry to the position of deployment, deploying on a front of 300 yards on tapes previously laid down, 150 yards each side of the Croisilles-Fontaine Road.

The first 2 waves were composed of D Company, Captain Brodhurst-Hill on the right of the road, and A Company (2nd Lt Carpenter) on the left with "mopping up" platoons of B and C companies forming a third line to the first wave. The 3rd and 4th waves moving at 50 yards intervals were made up of C and B Companies on right and left under Captain Ball and 2nd Lt Holliday; the 2 companies of the KRRC attached composed the 5th and 6th waves.

The advance from the position of deployment was over 1,000 yards of open country, along the valley of the Sensee River, which was only a trickle running in a water course giving only a certain amount of cover, but commanded generally from the high ground on either side. The front German trench was protected by at least two rows of barbed wire radiating from where the trench crossed the road, with more thick wire between the 1st and 2nd lines. The German front line trench was much knocked about, and for the most part not more than four feet deep. It was enfiladed from the north.

At 20 minutes before zero hour, the force was to advance to the line of a sunken road, crossing the Croisilles-Fontaine Road, which had been picqueted during the night by the 2nd Worcesters, and was to lie down there and wait for the barrage to fall; this was to dwell for 8 minutes on the front line and for 10  minutes on the 2nd line and then to continue behind the 2nd line until 90 minutes after zero, by which time it was expected that the 98th Brigade would have joined up. D and A Companies of the Queens were to cross the German first line and occupy and consolidate the second line. C Company was to make blocks on the right of the first line and form a defensive flank along a communication trench; B was to do the same on the left along the Sensee River. The KRRC companies were to form a central dump of bombs etc. and occupy and consolidate the German first line; the two tanks were to follow on the right of the attack and work down the enemy's line towards the river.

The Queens advanced at 4.15am and moved in good order to the sunken road and there lay down to wait for zero - fixed for 4.45am - without detection by the enemy, and then when the attack began, they worked up to within 50 yards of the barrage, entering the front trench with few casualties; this was found to contain only a few of the enemy who were quickly disposed of. The leading then went forward to the German 2nd line, but were now held up by very strong uncut wire, and the barrage on lifting was taken too far back and rested beyond, instead of on, the German 2nd line and the Germans were consequently able to man their parapet. Only a small party of A Company had managed to reach the second line and the remainder of the attackers took cover in the many shell holes between the 2 lines.

The 2 tanks which should have arrived by this time and given material assistance at a critical moment, never turned up, having broken down before zero.

Telephonic communications with battalion headquarters was established and maintained until 5.30am and communication was only possible with runners.

In the German first line on the right of the road two strong points were captured and bombing parties pushed 100 yards forward until held up by a third strong point and a double block was made here and established; this was maintained until 11am when the Germans made a determined attack with rifle grenades and bombs., but they were driven back by parties under Company Sergeant Major Elderkin. On the left a block was at first made at the river, but on the "box barrage" lifting the enemy attacked; he was however repulsed by the use of rifle grenades and a party under Corporal Spooner, following him up for 150 yards, captured a concrete blockhouse and a machine gun; on the enemy counter-attacking this was destroyed by a bomb and a block was then made 50 yards from the blockhouse and held until the end. The first line very soon became completely filled with wounded men, and it became increasingly difficult to pass bombs to the 5 different points where bombing was incessant

At 5.08am 2nd Lt Holliday reported the first line taken, but the second strongly held by Germans, while the tanks had not arrived. At 5.25am 5 prisoners of the German 99th regiment were passed back.

At 7.10am 2nd Lt Carpenter arrived at battalion headquarters wounded and reporting that the front line companies were running out of bombs; this was later confirmed by a message from Capt Godfrey, timed at 6.45am, reporting the shortage of bombs and Lewis Gun ammunition, and saying that the situation was critical. During the next few hours parties from the KRRC carried up nearly 1,500 bombs. Then at 10.10am Capt Godfrey was able to send a better report - that the advance of the 98th Brigade had relieved the pressure, and although the casualties were heavy the men were cheery and confident,  - but bombs, more bombs were wanted. 2 hours later came news that the enemy were pressing the defence with repeated bombing attacks, while the supply of bombs were again running low, and now at 1.20pm the last lot of 800 bombs was sent up, but before the carrying party had reached the front line the enemy had started strong bombing attacks from 5 different positions and 25 minutes later the Germans, having massed on the right, rushed the blocks under a barrage of aerial torpedoes and rifle grenades, the defenders supply of bombs having given out. The enemy pressure on the right flank now forced a retirement here, causing the cutting off of the men in the centre communication trench.

Many casualties occurred during this retirement, but the men rallied at the battalion headquarters, which was heavily shelled, and further losses incurred. Then at last, at 8pm, orders were received to fall back to the railway cutting near Judas Trench

Casualties were 13 officers killed, wounded or missing out of the 14 who began the attack, losses among the other ranks were 26 killed 101 wounded and 308 missing. 7 of the officers were reported as German prisoners of war.”